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THE INTERNET, SECURITIES REGULATION, AND THEORY
OF LAW
TAMAR FRANKEL*
INTRODUCTION
Rarely has a change in the environment affected society as dra-
matically as the Internet. It has transformed the way we retain, trans-
fer, and exchange information. At minimal cost, the Internet offers
far more information at a faster pace than ever before. It enables us
to interact around the globe with more people than at any time in the
past. When such dramatic environmental changes occur, drastic
changes in the law often follow.'
The Internet affects the environment in which securities markets
operate and the laws that govern them.2 The use of the Internet has
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I am indebted to Professors Hugh
Baxter and Wendy Gordon of Boston University School of Law for their insightful comments
on this article. Many thanks to my assistants Dan Pierce and William Hecker for their meticu-
lous research and editorial comments.
1. Professors Monroe E. Price and John F. Duffy have explained that "[j]udges and legis-
lators frequently invoke technological change as a justification for altering regulatory arrange-
ments, revising statutes, or reconsidering constitutional doctrine." Monroe E. Price & John F.
Duffy, Technological Change and Doctrinal Persistence: Telecommunications Reform in Con-
gress and the Court, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 976, 976 (1997). They posit that this may be especially
so when the technological change affects instruments of speech. See id. at 977. See generally
Michael A. Geist, The Reality of Bytes: Regulating Economic Activity in the Age of the Internet,
73 WASH. L. REV. 521 (1998) (discussing the development of Internet law, the impact of the
Internet on economic regulation, and proposals for adapting economic regulation to the Inter-
net, suggesting that no single approach is adequate).
2. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1985) ("Technology also affects the securities market
on a more fundamental level: it alters the market's structure."). Like it has securities laws, the
Internet has changed the regime in which many types of commercial transactions occur. For a
discussion of some of these changes, see Diana J.P. McKenzie, Commerce on the Net: Surfing
Through Cyberspace Without Getting Wet, 14 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 247
(1996) (attempting to identify some areas of potential liability for persons conducting business in
cyberspace). At the beginning of 1999, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt expressed his concern at
the impact that Internet trading has had on the patterns of investors' behavior. He noticed a 330
percent increase in investor complaints concerning Internet trading. The very speed and ease of
placing trades on-line encouraged certain patterns of behavior that exposed investors to higher
risks. Chairman Levitt warned investors against such tendencies. He has not suggested, how-
ever, any imminent changes in the rules. See SEC Chairman Levitt Addresses Internet Trading
Concerns, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1859, at 1 (Feb. 3, 1999).
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already begun to change the way information about securities is dis-
seminated and the way securities are traded,3 two activities regulated
by the securities laws.4
The purpose of this article is to begin an inquiry on a number of
questions: Should the securities laws be adapted to the use of the
Internet? If so, how? What path of inquiry should be taken to an-
swer the questions, and how should we think about adapting law to a
changing environment of actors and actions subject to law? These
questions are limited to the securities acts regulating securities mar-
kets. The inquiry, however, is broader. It touches on the way law
should change generally in a broader context of legal theory. The ar-
ticle starts by defining law, then examines two particular situations in
which securities markets have used the Internet, and the lawmakers'
response to these uses. The article concludes with a critical analysis
of this response in the context of legal theory.
Part I of this article proposes a view of law as an adaptive, self-
replicating system of coercive communications, consisting of three
parts: substance of coercive communications, mechanisms for en-
forcement, and mechanisms and methods for changing law. Parts II
and III of the article show how the three parts of the legal system re-
act to behavioral changes of those who are regulated by law as their
environment changes.
To examine the response of law in such cases, I chose two situa-
tions under the securities acts. The first, discussed in Part II of the ar-
ticle, deals with the use of the Internet to deliver prospectuses. The
Securities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") issued an in-
terpretive release in connection with transfers by the Internet in a
3. The Internet and other methods of electronic media have created major environmental
changes in areas other than securities regulation. See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Stored Value Cards
and the Consumer: The Need for Regulation, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1027 (1997) (arguing that fed-
eral legislation is needed in the area of electronic cash to ensure the integrity of the payment
system because many consumers are confused about the nature of the arising system). Professor
Budnitz' examination of electronic cash perhaps provides a good analogy to the situation re-
garding securities regulation. Like the regime he described, the integrity of the securities mar-
kets may be threatened by the emergence of the Internet if its use is not properly regulated. I
argue, however, that this is best done through the Commission and not through federal legisla-
tion.
4. For a discussion of another area where changes in technology have affected the securi-
ties markets and laws, see Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Property, Credit, and Regulation Meet In-
formation Technology: Clearance and Settlement in the Securities Markets, 55 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 131 (1992) (examining technology and commercial law in the context of securities mar-
ket clearing and settlement). See also Kenneth W. Brakebill, Note, The Application of Securities
Laws in Cyberspace: Jurisdictional and Regulatory Problems Posed by Internet Securities Trans-
actions, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 901 (1996) (examining new securities law issues raised
by the Internet).
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way that maintained the status quo.' In this manner, the Commission
allowed issuers and some investors to capture the benefits of the
Internet, while reducing adverse effects of this use on other investors,
in furtherance of the policies of the securities acts.6 The three-part
model of law is applied to analyze the adaptation of the securities
laws on this subject.
Part III of the article describes the regulation of securities ex-
changes-a species of securities trading markets-and the use of the
Internet to establish on-line trading sites. In some cases, the staff of
the Commission allowed issuers to provide such trading sites to their
shareholders Applying the model of law to this example, the far-
reaching implications of such permission are highlighted and lead to a
proposed method of adapting the securities laws to Internet trading
sites.
Here, we must reexamine fundamental policies underlying the
law and adopt a new format of changing and enforcing law. This Part
examines an emerging cooperative effort among the adaptive mecha-
nisms of law: the Commission and custom-creating markets. I believe
that in order to cope with the fundamental changes that the Internet
may introduce into the securities markets, two parts of law's adaptive
structure - the Commission and the markets - must closely interact to
allow for experiments and controls almost simultaneously. These two
actors are already moving in this direction.
The proposed three-part model of law is designed to provide a
framework for explaining, and especially guiding, the way we think
about adapting law to changes in the environment of actors. Hope-
fully, a developed model will help predict the law's response to
changes in the environment. I recognize that technology and markets
are not the only drivers of legal change; law is also affected by the
existing legal infrastructure, which may provide actors both incentives
and disincentives to certain behavior and changed environments. The
focus of this article, however, is on adaptation of law to changes in
people's behavior as their environment changes.
The inquiry here transcends the particular issues under the secu-
5. See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Release No. 7233, 60
Fed. Reg. 53,458, 53,459 (Oct. 13, 1995) [hereinafter Use of Electronic Media] (noting that re-
lease does not affect parties' rights or responsibilities under the securities laws).
6. See id. at 53,458 (noting benefits of electronic distribution).
7. See, e.g., Real Goods Trading Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1996-1997 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 77,226, at 77,131 (June 24, 1996) [hereinafter RGTC No-
Action Letter].
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rities laws. It may help develop a broader generalization-a model of
law's adaptation to the changed environments of those whom it
regulates. As we are experiencing an ever-increasing pace of change
in all aspects of our lives, a systematic inquiry into the response of law
to change is critical.
I. A VIEW OF LAW: A THREE-PART ADAPTIVE, SELF-REPLICATING
SYSTEM OF COERCIVE COMMUNICATIONS USED TO HELP
ORGANIZE SOCIETY
I view law as an adaptive, self-replicating system of coercive
communications.8 While not the only view of law, this view provides
a useful framework for examining law's response to a changing envi-
ronment. "Changing environment" means changing beliefs, activities,
and behavior of actors in the society. "Response of law" means re-
sponse to this changing environment -changes in the organizational
rules under which society functions.9 Further, there is no consensus
on the concept of coercion. Some would view the law as coercive
only if it is backed by the force of a political unit, such as the state.1" I
take a more expansive view of coercion to include the coercive force
of custom. This, of course, means that there is no clear dividing line
between law and social rules that people may feel constrained to fol-
low without threat of state-enforced sanctions. We may distinguish
between customary law that is sanctioned by "legal-like" sanctions
and methods, and law that is not. In any event, the problem is not
unique to our context here. The law concerning the definition of con-
tracts as opposed to non-contract obligations poses similar issues and
can provide a guide to the distinction as well. 1
Law is a structured system. The structure consists of substance,
enforcement mechanisms, and mechanisms and methods of adapta-
tion. The term "system" denotes a holistic view of a complex ar-
8. See Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "Relative Autonomy" of Law, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1987, 2037-39 (1998) (describing view that legal system is structurally coupled to societal
system).
9. I do not view law as a living organism. It is a species of communication among actors in
society. This communication helps organize society and its members' relationships and activi-
ties.
10. See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES
OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 13-23 (Noonday Press 1954) (1832, 1863) (defining "com-
mand" as idea that is sanctioned if disobeyed).
11. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 1.1, at 4 (2d ed. 1990)
(defining "contract" as "a promise, or a set of promises, that the law will enforce or
... recognize"; "[a] promise for which the promisee has given nothing in return" is generally not
enforceable).
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rangement composed of types of items and individual items related in
a predictable pattern-a repetitious rhythm.1 2 "Structure" denotes a
stable relationship among the parts of the system: "The mutual rela-
tion of the constituent parts or elements of a whole as determining its
peculiar nature or character . ... " The securities laws, with which I
deal later, also constitute a system. We have a seamless web of sys-
tems within systems, from the atoms to the cosmos, each with some-
what different fundamental rules and yet each relating to the whole
and to each other. Our organization of chaos into patterns of orders
and systems is not a reality but one which we need in order to be able
to think about issues and sort out solutions. This article deals with a
specific legal system-the securities laws-and relates it to law gener-
ally, a broader system to which the securities laws belong.
A. Law Is a Structured System "
Law's structure contains three main parts: (1) the substance of
coercive communications to members of a society; (2) mechanisms
and methods of enforcing these communications; and (3) mechanisms
and methods for adapting the structure and the substance of its com-
ponents to changing environments.
12. A system is:
An organized or connected group of objects.
* A set or assemblage of things connected, associated, or interdependent, so as to
form a complex unity; a whole composed of parts in orderly arrangement according to
some scheme or plan; rarely applied to a simple or small assemblage of things (nearly =
'group' or 'set').
[In linguistics:] A group of terms, units, or categories, in a paradigmatic relation-
ship to one another.
17 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 496 (2d ed. 1989). Thus, the term "system" focuses on
the whole rather than its parts and on a pattern of relationships among the parts. In this sense a
system is predictable. However, a system need not be stable. For example, a system can be
chaotic, so long as its parts consistently relate to each other in a chaotic manner.
13. 16 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 959 (2d ed. 1989); see also id. ("[an organized
body or combination of mutually connected and dependent parts or elements," and "[in a wider
sense: [a] fabric or framework of material parts put together"). Thus, the earmarks of a struc-
ture are particular elements, and a relationship among them that is stable and paints the whole
with the color of a unique identity. Arguably, a chaotic system does not have a structure be-
cause, although the relationship among its components gives the whole an identity, its structure
is not sufficiently determinate.
14. The idea of this structure of law was triggered by Karl Popper's collection of lectures,
THE MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK. See KARL R. POPPER, The Rationality of Scientific Revolu-
tions: Selection Versus Instruction, in THE MYTH OF THE FRAMEWORK 1 (M.A. Notturno ed.,
1994). Popper compares and distinguishes three adaptive systems: genes, behavior, and scien-
tific theories. See id. at 2-7. He says that all three adaptive systems have a current structure and
each structure contains mechanisms for adapting to a changing environment in accordance with
certain rules. See id. at 2-5; see also Baxter, supra note 8, at 2037-39 (describing that effect on
communications by other systems depends on structures of legal system).
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I recognize that the very act of enforcement can change law and
that many enforcement and adaptive mechanisms can perform both
functions. Some mechanisms and their impact differ in degree. By
enforcing the law, the police introduce some change, but not as much
as legislatures or courts. It seems that the more "hands-on" enforce-
ment mechanisms perform, the less immediate general impact they
may have. Perhaps the police change law in a way similar to the way
market actors change the law, gradually and incrementally. En-
forcement and change may be distinguished by their purpose, focus,
and intended results. This distinction helps the analysis and justifies
treating them separately.
1. Substance
The main part of the law's structure consists of the substance of
coercive communications to members of a society. This part is or-
ganized according to the generality of the communications: (1) spe-
cific decisions, defining the relationship among individuals and enti-
ties; (2) rules that apply generally to types of individuals and entities; 5
and (3) foundational norms, values, and policies that the rules are de-
signed to implement. 6 Rules subsume and generalize specific deci-
sions; values and policies subsume and generalize both latter types of
15. There are detailed statutes, rules, forms, and guidelines regarding the required disclo-
sure for securities offerings, the prohibitions on offerings of unregistered securities, and the pro-
hibitions on fraud. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1994) (prohibiting the sale of unregistered secu-
rities); id. § 77aa (listing the items of information required in a registration statement); id. §
78j(b) (prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities); 17 C.F.R. §§
229.501-.502 (1998) (listing the items of information to appear in a prospectus). The rules gov-
erning the stock exchanges and behavior of broker-dealers provide for the orderly operation of
the markets by prohibiting these intermediaries from taking unfair advantage of investors and
issuers. See 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (1994) (stating that rules of an exchange "are designed to pre-
vent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices" and "to remove impediments to and per-
fect the mechanism of a free and open market and a national market system"); id. § 78o-3(b)(6)
(requiring similar objectives). These rules are promulgated by the exchanges and the National
Association of Securities Dealers and reviewed by the Commission. See id. § 78s (granting
Commission oversight over self-regulatory organizations).
16. Underlying the securities laws are two paramount policies: the policy of protecting in-
vestors, designed to entice investors to put their money at risk in the markets, and the policy of
facilitating capital formation, designed to assist issuers in raising capital. See H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (stating that the purpose of
securities laws is "to protect investors and to maintain confidence in the securities markets" to
benefit "national savings, capital formation, and investment"). These two objectives are consid-
ered beneficial to the public as a whole and to members of the public. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
78n(a) (1994) (prohibiting solicitation of proxies in violation of the rules and regulations "as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protec-
tion of investors"). They conflict to some extent and require a balancing, with a higher value
given to protecting investors.
[Vol. 73:1319
1998] THE INTERNET, SECURITIES REGULATION, AND THEORY OF LAW 1325
items. 7 This format of communication is not surprising. It mirrors
the format in which humans retain information and is a usual format
(though not the only one) of communicating, organizing, and retain-
ing detailed and complex data. 18 To be sure, the features of legal sub-
stance are not as clear-cut. The characteristics of "legal values" can
be attributable to non-legal disciplines as well. 9 However, taken to-
gether with law's other features there emerges a unique system that is
distinguishable from other systems.
2. Mechanisms and Methods of Enforcement
Law's structure contains mechanisms of enforcing law's commu-
nications. The mechanisms include designated actors that implement
these coercive measures in law. The actors themselves are not part of
law; their designation, however, is. Some measures are used by gov-
ernments to enforce their coercive communications; others-usually
similar mechanisms-are used by the public to enforce its customs.
In addition, regulators and the courts recognize accepted customs and
use their enforcement powers to coerce compliance with the dictates
of these customs.0 While law prescribes the identity of law enforcers
and their methods, enforcers, such as administrative agencies, can de-
velop "soft" indirect enforcement mechanisms that produce compli-
ance. These methods are effective when applied to regulated indus-
17. For example, the securities laws contain many decisions regarding wrongful fraudulent
statements (or omissions) by a defendant to the detriment of a plaintiff. See, e.g., In re MGSI
Sec., Inc., Securities Act Release No. 7578 (Sept. 10, 1998), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library,
Secrel File. These decisions may be based on Rule lOb-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). The prohibitions on fraud, as many other securities acts'
regulations, are based on two policies: protecting investors, to maintain their confidence in the
markets' integrity, and the encouragement of capital formation. See, e.g., Sargent v. Genesco,
Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that basic intent of the 1934 Act antifraud provi-
sions is same as that of the 1934 Act: "to protect investors and instill confidence in the securities
markets").
18. Cf K. ERIC DREXLER, ENGINES OF CREATION 217-18 (1986) (pointing to the issue of
information overload and the need for organizing information); Mary C. Potter, Remembering,
in 3 THINKING: AN INVITATION TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE 3, 4-17 (Daniel N. Osherson & Ed-
ward E. Smith eds., 1990) (describing process of encoding and retrieving information).
19. See Baxter, supra note 8, at 2037-62 (discussing view that legal system has "structural
couplings" to other systems).
20. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-202(a) (1995) (final written expression may be explained or sup-
plemented by course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance); JOHN D. CALAMARI
& JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 3.13, at 155 (4th ed. 1998) (stating that
course of performance, course of dealing, and trade usage are used in determining the intent of
parties in interpreting a writing); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS § 33, at 193-96 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (discussing custom as evi-
dence of the standard of reasonable conduct). But see Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Mer-
chant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
1765 (1996) (critiquing the UCC's search for and application of "immanent business norms").
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tries whose business depends on an ongoing relationship with regula-
tors.21
3. Mechanisms and Methods for Change
Mechanisms for change are part of an adaptive system and the
structure of law. The existence of such mechanisms per se does not
destabilize the structure; rather, the mechanisms are crucial to the
continuous existence of the structure. The structure must be stable,
as well as resilient to change. Without adaptability, the structure will
be too brittle and break with even minor changes in the environment.
Adaptive mechanisms can cause changes in various parts of the
structure, mostly in the number and sometimes nature of the individ-
ual items, of which the structure is the organizing pattern. Even if the
types of items change, the structure may remain intact. However, the
structure may lose its identity and become another type of system, or
perish, if fundamental changes occur in the nature of the relationships
among the items and types of items within the structure or in the
main components of the structure.22
The same principles apply to law. Most adaptive changes in law
do not affect the foundational components of law's structure nor the
norms, values, policies, or types of items in the substantive part of the
structure; they affect the content and the number of items in the parts
of the structure, leaving the structure intact. However, if norms, val-
ues, or policies within the substance of law's coercive communications
change in a fundamental way, or if the mechanisms for enforcement
or mechanisms for change are eliminated or significantly altered, the
particular legal system may be doomed to lose its identity; it may be-
21. For example, rather than bring enforcement, administrative, or judicial proceedings, or
together with such proceedings, administrative agencies can publish their opinions or concerns
regarding certain practices that the regulators have observed emerging in the industry. The
Commission's Division of Investment Management occasionally expresses its concerns in a let-
ter to Matthew Fink, President of the Investment Company Institute, the trade association of
the mutual fund industry. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst., 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 673 (Apr.
19, 1993). Such publications and letters are relatively inexpensive and raise the industry's
awareness and diligence. Similarly, regulators may seek information and education about the
market practices from the industry and others. That allows regulators, industry, and consumers
to develop a common language and mutual understanding. Arguably, regulators that come too
close to industries can become captives of the industries. However, even if regulators become
captive, captivity is partial because regulators are subject to congressional supervision and me-
dia surveillance. On the plus side, captivity of this sort encourages open discourse, effective en-
forcement measures, and avoidance of confrontational relationships that, in the last analysis, do
not necessarily result in effective regulation.
22. This is the danger that is posed to the identity of legal systems from absorbing different
definitions of relationship and abandoning some of the main features of law, such as coercion.
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come another kind of system or perish.23
In law, the mechanisms of change consist of four designated
types of actors, each of which can create and adapt law: (1) legisla-
tures that enact statutes or rules; (2) agencies that implement statutes,
rules, and their own decisions, such as the Commission; (3) courts
that adapt legislative statutes, rules, and their own decisions; and (4)
markets that create and adapt customary laws.
Arguably, markets are part of the actors' environment rather
than part of law. Clearly, markets are unique and distinguished from
the three other lawmakers. First, in the markets, the actors that
change the law and the actors that change the environment may be
the same or closely connected. Business persons and lawyers create
new customs or more likely adjust existing customs in reaction to an
invention. An invention that changed the environment and custom-
ary law are both products of the market. The Internet demonstrates
this point.
Second, in market law, it is harder to identify the individuals or
institutions that change law. To be sure, there are leaders that trigger
a new or different path. Each follower leaves its imprint on and
strengthens the coercive force of new customs. Moreover, the re-
sulting customary laws can be attributed to preferences and decisions
of a multitude of individuals. Thus, market customary laws are the
product of actions and ideas of numerous individuals. Their hand
may be visible, but not identifiable.
The difficulty of identifying the law changers has a number of
benefits and disadvantages. On the minus side, among other things:
(1) it is more difficult to attach responsibility to particular actors for
changes in the law; (2) there is no requirement that the changes will
be rationalized or justified; (3) there are no review mechanisms re-
garding the substance of changed custom; (4) at the initial stage of
change, it is difficult to predict where the change in customary law
will lead and when it will end; and (5) market activities are difficult to
monitor because few market actors have the duty to report.
Some of these disadvantages are reduced by the unique process
of change: (1) review and legitimacy of an adaptive new custom de-
pends on the degree of its following; (2) because custom must be
publicized (or else it will have no followers), the rationalization of the
23. For example, if law is shorn of its coercive component, it will cease to be law. If legal
values are fully substituted by philosophical or economic values, law is likely to disappear and
be subsumed in other disciplines.
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changes in the custom may be aired in the public domain, similar to
the public domain discussion of political ideas; (3) the itemized justi-
fication may not be as important when numerous actors follow the
new custom. Their following is a "black box" that proves the cus-
tom's value, like the price of a product that determines its value, even
though the buyers may have different reasons for buying the product;
(4) market law does not become coercive immediately; law's coercive
weight depends on the degree and intensity of its following. Thus, as
adoption and following of market law-custom-grows, so does its
coercive backing and its predictability. Hence, it is also less necessary
to identify the persons who started breaking the new path; (5) when-
ever custom requires a review, amendment, or adoption, the other
three mechanisms of change (the legislatures, courts, and administra-
tive agencies) are available to perform the task; and (6) market activi-
ties and complaints about inadequacies of market law can be brought
to the attention of the three other mechanisms of change by competi-
tors, consumers, and other affected parties through hearings and by
other means.
In addition, other lawmakers also change the environment in
which law operates. The traditional lawmakers are increasingly
drawing on the markets for the substance of law by incorporating
"best practices" of industries.24 Lawmakers also use the markets to
enforce law through self-regulatory organizations, trade organiza-
tions, and other means.2s Further, the Internet environment is par-
ticularly conducive to the creation and enforcement of customary law.
Many of the characteristics of customary law are immediately recog-
nizable in the world of cyberspace. Markets have become a law-
maker in too many ways to be relegated to a mere environmental fac-
tor. Therefore, notwithstanding the differences between markets as
lawmakers and other lawmakers, I consider markets to be lawmakers
rather than the mere environment in which law operates.
Adaptive methods differ in different structures. Karl Popper has
observed such differences in genetic, behavioral, and theoretical
24. See Laurence H. Meyer, Address at Widener University (Apr. 16, 1998), available in
LEXIS, Banking Library, Fedpr File ("[A]n important function of supervisors is to act as some-
thing of a clearinghouse for best practices.").
25. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1994) (granting the Commission oversight authority over
regulatory organizations); Investment Co. Inst., 1988 SEC No-Act. Lexis 315 (Feb. 25, 1988)
(noting that the Commission staff considered industry comments in its decision); Robert
McGough, Top Regulator Urges Industry to Reform, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1996, at C31 (noting
that Barry Barbash, director of Commission Division of Investment Management, warned mu-
tual fund industry about soft-dollar practices in recent speech).
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structures. In reaction to environmental changes, genetic systems
mutate in a non-cognitive and non-intentional manner.26 Those un-
lucky genes that do not mutate "correctly" die, and those lucky genes
that happen to mutate in the "right" way live.27 Behavioral systems
usually adapt by intentional, cognitive actions using a trial and error
method.2 s Unlucky actors that do not learn from the errors suffer the
consequences and die, and those who tried the right way or learned
from the errors live and prosper.
Scientific theories are changed cognitively as well, but unlike be-
havioral systems, changes are guided by reasoning (and partially by
intuition). 29  The changes occur after rigorous testing by reasoning
and experiments." In addition, scientific theories must pass the test-
ing of expert colleagues.3' In some respects the process is similar to
market adaptation. A leader breaks a new path and, unless he con-
vinces the followers, the theory dies or lies dormant until such a fol-
lowing is formed. A similar process applies to other lawmakers. The
process, however, is more institutionalized, legitimizing change and
its support only through the proper channels.
Adaptation of law is generally effected in three ways: (1) textual
interpretation, by exploring meaning and applying analogy; (2) policy
considerations, more remote from text: identifying the problem, ex-
plaining the problem, choosing the criteria for solutions, listing the
options, and choosing the solutions in light of the criteria; and (3)
culmination of decisions and actions of numerous individuals and
units in the markets. However, all adaptation methods depend to a
certain degree on followers and consensus, including desires of pow-
erful organized groups. Adaptations are also affected by the law-
makers' own interests (e.g., to be re-elected or avoid being overruled
by higher courts). These pressures rarely form part of the formal
methods of adaptation; their existence, however, is recognized (and
sometimes criticized).
Methods of adaptation depend to some extent on which type of
lawmakers engage in adapting law. Custom adapts through a gradu-
26. See POPPER, supra note 14, at 5 (noting that genetic mutations are not goal-directed).
27. See id. at 3 (noting that badly adapted mutations are eliminated).
28. See id. at 5 (noting that behavioral trials are goal-directed).
29. To some extent methods of law change, and changes in scientific theories are similar in
that adaptations in scientific theories can also be distinguished by the methods chosen, e.g.,
some scientists are theorizers, some are experimenters, and some choose to do both.
30. See POPPER, supra note 14, at 6 (noting that scientific theories are open to investiga-
tion).
31. See id. at 7 (noting that scientific theories are open to criticism).
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ally increasing following.32 The other three kinds of lawmakers-leg-
islatures, courts, and administrative agencies-use methods similar to
scientific theories' adaptations, based on cognitive decisions. How-
ever, courts and administrative agencies use both textual and policy
methods, while legislatures use mostly policy methods.
Arguably, the methods of courts and administrative agencies dif-
fer: courts use a textual approach, while agencies use a policy analysis
approach. I conclude, however, that both courts and agencies use
both approaches. Administrative agencies must interpret the text of
the governing legislation and follow its dictates to determine their
authority and the guiding principles for their actions. However,
where agencies, such as the Commission, have powers that extend
beyond judicial decisions, such as ex ante advisory powers or exemp-
tive powers,33 they may have to use a policy analysis approach. Some
judicial decisions have taken the policy approach.'
32. This method resembles in one respect the adaptation of genetic systems because it does
not have a single cognitive intentional actor. See id. at 5 (noting that genetic mutations are not
goal-directed). However, I do not view law as a living organism. Rather, I view it as a mecha-
nism that society must have and develop in order to survive. Law is not the cell or the gene but
rather the basic rules that enable the community to function, the analog of the rules that make
the body and mind function. For example, living organisms develop a structure according to
certain rules. The larger they are, the larger their bone structure must be. However, as societies
become more complex, so does the law and other non-law rules that regulate the behavior of
societies' members. I do not view law as a mere communication system because law is coercive.
Mainly, these views, which are interesting and intriguing, are not useful for the inquiry under-
taken in this article.
33. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1994) (authorizing the Commission to exempt parties or
securities from the Investment Company Act of 1940 where in the public interest).
34. See, e.g., SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65 (1959). In the
VALIC case, the Supreme Court was asked to determine the law applicable to variable annui-
ties. See id. at 66-69. This issue required classification of the annuities as either insurance or
securities. The annuities had features of securities because the annuity contract holders, rather
than the insurance company (as is the case with traditional fixed annuities), bore the risks and
took the benefits of investment of the reserves funding these annuities. See id. at 70-71.
Justice Douglas, for the majority, adopted a doctrinal analysis, phrasing the issue in terms
of a definition: Are variable annuities securities or are they insurance? See id. at 68. Justice
Brennan took a policy approach: Do investors in variable annuities need the protection of the
securities acts? See id. at 76 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan concluded that variable
annuities are both insurance and securities and that their classification would not be helpful to
provide the answer. See id. at 80-81 (Brennan, J., concurring). Rather, his question led to the
answer that, while in a traditional annuity the insurance company was a debtor that took the
investment risk, in the new type of variable annuities the insurance company became a manager
of other people's money, at their risk. See id. at 80 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. at 78
(Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Tihe situation changes where the coin of the company's obligation
is not money but is rather the present condition of its investment portfolio. To this extent, the
historic functions of state insurance regulation become meaningless." Hence, investors/annuity
contract holders needed the protection of the securities acts.).
[Vol. 73:1319
1998] THE INTERNET, SECURITIES REGULA TION, AND THEORY OF LAW 1331
B. Relation of Adapting Law to Existing Law
Karl Popper said that while all new scientific theories change at
least parts of former theories, showing that the former theories are
either wrong or incomplete, new theories encompass the (partial)
truth of the theories they contradict. 3 Thus, Einstein's theory of rela-
tivity differs from Newton's theory by showing that it is not true in
certain environments, yet subsumes Newton's theory for the limited
environment as to which it is true.36
In law, the relationships between new and traditional policies
and rules seem different than in science. Law can be tested by norms
of right and wrong as well as by truth and falsity. Theoretically, norm
setting seems to allow lawmakers more discretion to change existing
laws than scientific theorizers would have; lawmakers can introduce
new fundamental policies and values that fully trump and deviate
from their predecessors rather than subsume them.
Yet, in reality, the way in which the law changes is astoundingly
similar to the way in which new theories in science are fashioned.37
Most new legal rules and underlying policies conflict with parts of
their predecessors but contain and reaffirm part of their predeces-
sors.38 Generally, like most new scientific theories, new adaptive laws
subsume most of prior laws and only "tweak" them in certain areas.
There can be a number of reasons for the conservative attitude
of lawmakers to adapting and modifying law. In fact, these reasons
are similar (and some are identical) to the reasons for the doctrine of
stare decisis.
First, new laws are risky and costly for lawmakers and the regu-
lated. Existing laws have been tested, and their strengths and weak-
nesses in a normally changing environment are known. New laws
that have not been tested may bring unanticipated results.39 Unlike
35. See POPPER, supra note 14, at 12 (noting that a new theory must be able to explain the
success of the former theory, thus the former theory "must appear as a good approximation to
the new theory").
36. See id. at 21 (noting that Einstein's theory contains Newton's theory as an approxima-
tion); id. at 20 (noting that the old theory is "approximately valid for velocities which are small
compared with the velocity of light").
37. Arguably, the problem lies not on our following the trodden paths but in not suffi-
ciently breaking away from them. See DREXLER, supra note 18, at 231 ("The difficulty lies, not
in the new ideas, but in escaping the old ones .. " (quoting John Maynard Keynes)).
38. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 n.22 (1988) (noting that actions under
Rule lOb-5 of the 1934 Act "are distinct from common-law deceit and misrepresentation claims,
and are in part designed to add to the protections provided investors by the common law" (cita-
tions omitted)).
39. See, e.g., Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by Registered Open-End Management
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scientific theories,' it is almost impossible to test new laws in advance
and limit these results.'
Second, new laws impose learning costs on the legal profession,
lawmakers, the regulated, and the public. Even something as minor
as the introduction of new section numbers to a body of law imposes
such costs. 2 In addition, while old laws have been examined and in-
terpreted, new laws must acquire their interpretative gloss. Devel-
oping this gloss is costly.
Third, we have a limited capacity for attention. That is why we
create habits that put ourselves on "automatic pilot." Doing so en-
ables us to pay attention to new and unexpected (and, therefore,
more risky) events. Old laws are habitually followed by most people
(or habitually not followed by some people). That is why, while they
are excited by new ideas, people cannot easily break old habits. New
laws require law-abiding citizens to break old habits and create habits
of compliance.43 That is costly.
Therefore, even when logic may require a complete break from
the past, experience builds on the past. People rarely adopt entirely
new values and policies or rules that do not relate to existing legal
and social structures and behavioral norms."
Finally, laws are not enacted in a vacuum. They do not start with
a clean slate but against the backdrop of the other existing laws.
Fundamental changes in the structure of law affect these other laws
and may require drastic changes of all existing laws addressing the
same area or subject matter. That is costly. Consequently, when
changes in the laws are necessary, the bulk of existing law is left in-
tact.
Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 16,431, 53 Fed. Reg. 23,258,
23,264 (June 21, 1988) (noting that the use of Rule 12b-1 by the mutual fund industry "has re-
sulted in many distribution practices that could not have been anticipated when the rule was
adopted").
40. Arguably, even scientific theories cannot be accurately tested because the very testing,
in some environments, changes the results.
41. This is why we favor state laws, dual regulation, and market experimentation, even if
they may bring some adverse results. The receptive attitude to requests for exemptions and no-
action letters by the Commission is in part due to the desire for information about market ex-
perimentation. See 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS ch. II, sec.
C, § 1, at 148 (Supp. 1998).
42. If new numbers are introduced merely for the sake of symmetry, the cost may exceed
the benefit.
43. Cf RAGNAR GRANIT, THE PURPOSIVE BRAIN 128 (1980) (physiologically people need
and, therefore recreate, a stable world).
44. That is why "legal transplants" take roots successfully when they are planted in a fertile
ground of familiar laws, ideas, culture, and history. Otherwise, they usually shrivel and die.
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C. Relationship of Environmental Changes to Legal Change
The impact of a changed environment on law is not uniform.
The impact depends on which part of the law's structure the changed
environment affects. If the effect is on specific cases or rules, the im-
pact of the rules will change. Therefore, rules must be amended in
order to maintain the status quo: the fundamental policies which the
rules implement. If, however, the changed environment affects the
fundamental policies and the values on which the legal system is
based, when the old order that is subject to regulation is changed,
when different actors, driven by different incentives take the place of
the old actors, then a far more complex response by the law may be
necessary.
A new environment may eliminate the problems that existing
laws, regulating the old order, were designed to reduce or eliminate;
it may raise new problems that existing laws do not address. A new
environment can lead to different problem definitions and values un-
derlying the definition. In such cases the underlying policies and per-
haps the very structure of the laws must be reexamined.45
II. REGULATION OF PROSPECTUS DELIVERY
The emerging cyberspace is posing significant challenges to legal
adaptation. In the securities area, cyberspace has a serious impact in
two senses. First, it creates an entirely different mode of communica-
tion. The question here is: How should legal rules change to accom-
modate the new communication technology? If cyberspace does not
alter our fundamental values, how should legal rules adapt and
change in order to maintain our current values? What should the
substance of our rules be in light of the changing environment for the
actors in the securities markets?
45. An analogy to the discussion of electronic currency law again seems appropriate here.
Mr. Brian W. Smith and Mr. Ramsey J. Wilson argue that a proposal for the development of
such law should be constrained by two premises:
First, the law should not stifle or steer without reason future technological develop-
ment .... Further, regulations that focus heavily on technological distinctions between
payment systems would be unwise, because: (1) it is likely that such distinctions will
become antiquated quickly in this fast-paced industry; and (2) such distinctions fail to
consider the substance of the underlying relationship between the parties.
Brian W. Smith & Ramsey J. Wilson, How Best to Guide the Evolution of Electronic Currency
Law, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1105, 1127 (1997). It is important to remember that we are dealing
with a rapidly evolving area of technology. The difficult goal, of course, is to regulate Internet
use to the extent necessary to protect investors while not stifling developments which bring
about net efficiencies.
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Second, cyberspace allows communication at an unheard of
speed. The issue here is: Which mechanism and method for legal
change is more suited to respond quickly in this new environment,
recognizing that some existing mechanisms and methods of legal ad-
aptation simply cannot operate at such speed? Police using a horse
and buggy cannot match nor catch a speeding car, let alone a plane.
Based on the framework developed in Part I, these two issues
relate to the substance of the legal system and to the mechanisms and
methods of change of the legal system.
This Part of the article inquires into the impact of the Internet on
the delivery of prospectuses. The securities acts regulate disclosure
concerning securities offerings in a number of ways. Some informa-
tion is required, and some information is prohibited. ' The discussion
here relates only to the requirement of delivering a prospectus to po-
tential investors in a public offering."
There are two main policies underlying the securities acts. One
is to maintain investors' confidence in the integrity of the markets
mainly through disclosure: reducing investors' information costs and
shifting these costs to the issuers and others, such as market interme-
diaries, for whom the costs are lower. s The second policy underlying
the securities acts is somewhat subservient to the first but has become
increasingly important in recent years. This policy is to reduce the
costs of and encourage capital formation. ' 9 The Commission is sensi-
tive to the costs imposed on issuers and intermediaries and is sympa-
thetic to means of reducing the regulatory costs. °
A. Need to Adapt Securities Regulation to Internet Communications:
Impact of the Internet on the Environment of the Actors that Are
Subject to the Securities Laws
As compared to traditional modes of information transfer, the
Internet can reduce the cost of transmitting information for issuers,
46. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77h(d) (1994) (prohibiting untrue statements in a registration
statement); id. § 77aa (listing the items of information required in a registration statement).
47. See id. § 77e(b)(2) (requiring prospectus delivery under the 1933 Act).
48. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Report to the Congress: The Impact of Recent
Technological Advances on the Securities Markets (last modified Nov. 26, 1997) <http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/techrp97.htm>.
49. See H.R. REP. No. 104-622, at 16 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3878
(noting that a purpose of the 1996 legislation is the promotion of capital formation).
50. See Use of Electronic Media, supra note 5, at 53,458 (noting that the use of electronic
media allows the dissemination of information in a more cost-effective manner than paper-
based methods).
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intermediaries, and some investors. Hence, these parties sought to
deliver and receive prospectuses through the Internet, and they asked
the Commission to clarify the status of this form of information deliv-
ery. 1
B. The Commission's Response to the Internet Environment
Substance, Enforcement, Mechanisms for Change, and Methods of
Change
1. Impact on the Substance of the Securities Laws
As a new mode of communication, the Internet does not affect
the desirability of information transfer, nor does it impose a different
institutional arrangement concerning delivery of prospectuses. The
new mode of information transfer affects only the manner in which
the information is transferred. Thus, the use of the Internet does not
change the values underlying the fundamental policies on which our
securities laws are based, the criteria of what is good-which law
should either leave alone or support-and bad-which the law should
restrict or prohibit altogether. Further, prospectus delivery by the
Internet does not seem to affect the fundamental policies of the secu-
rities acts. If the status quo for investors remains the same, the un-
derlying policies of the securities acts are not adversely affected by
the use of the Internet to deliver prospectuses. In fact, by reducing
the costs of capital formation, the securities laws' policies are ad-
vanced.
To maintain the status quo, the rules must be changed. Inves-
tors' costs of receiving prospectuses through the Internet must be ex-
amined. First, not all investors have access to the Internet or wish to
receive prospectuses through the Internet. 2 Some of those who do,
however, prefer to receive information through this new medium.53
51. See id. at 53,460 (noting that the release is intended to provide guidance regarding elec-
tronic delivery). In 1995, the Commission issued a detailed release accompanied by questions
and answers that guided the use of the Internet for delivering prospectuses. See id. at 53,458.
The Commission recognized the increase in electronic prospectus delivery in its November 1998
release proposing prospectus delivery reforms. See The Regulation of Securities Offerings, Se-
curities Act Release No. 7606A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174, 67,223 (Dec. 4, 1998) ("Electronic delivery
of prospectuses is becoming more common."); cf id. at 67,216 (noting that the proposed easing
of restrictions on communications during the offering process "would enable issuers and market
participants to take significantly greater advantage of the Internet and other electronic media to
communicate and deliver information to investors").
52. See Use of Electronic Media, supra note 5, at 53,461 ("[N]ot all investors purchasing
securities could be presumed to have the ability to access the final prospectus via an Internet
Web site.").
53. See id. (noting that investor consent, coupled with notice and access, may satisfy the
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Clearly, if investors can choose between the new mode of information
transfer and the traditional one, they can evaluate their costs and
make the decision accordingly. This is precisely the first condition
that the Commission imposed on the use of the Internet for prospec-
tus delivery. 4 However, once investors make the choice, they bear
the burden of notifying the senders if they change their mind. After
their initial choice has been made, the mode of information transfer
remains the same until they change the choice.
This, however, is not all. Prospectuses are written in English.5
Information transfer through the Internet involves an electronic lan-
guage as well. Therefore, regardless of the investors' consent, the
Commission requires that the electronic language used to transfer the
prospectuses not be unduly complex or unavailable. 6
Professor Lawrence Lessig suggested that the first question we
should ask about the regulation of the Internet is: "Should this new
space, cyberspace, be regulated by analogy to the regulation of other
space, not quite cyber, or should we give up analogy and start
anew?"57 In the area of prospectus delivery, the Commission chose
the path of regulation by analogy. Under existing laws, there are a
number of acceptable ways to deliver a prospectus, such as the mails
or physical handing over.59 These traditional delivery forms have
proven highly reliable.' There is less certainty today that Internet
delivery will be as reliable, and investors bear a greater risk that pro-
spectuses will fail to reach them. Therefore, the Commission re-
quired that senders of prospectuses receive some indication of re-
ceipt: for example, that the receiver downloaded or copied the
information, or actively responded in some other way to the informa-
61tion.
delivery requirement).
54. See id.
55. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.403(c) (1998) (requiring English language for a registration state-
ment).
56. See Use of Electronic Media, supra note 5, at 53,460-61 (discussing access).
57. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1743 (1995).
58. See Use of Electronic Media, supra note 5, at 53,460 ("The Commission believes that
the question of whether delivery through electronic media has been achieved is most easily ex-
amined by analogy to paper delivery procedures.").
59. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1994) (requiring securities to be accompanied or preceded
by a prospectus); Securities Act Concepts and Their Effects on Capital Formation, Securities
Act Release No. 7314, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,044, 40,047 (July 31, 1996) (discussing the fulfillment of
delivery requirements by actual and constructive delivery).
60. See Use of Electronic Media, supra note 5, at 53,458 (implying benefits of paper deliv-
ery in requiring electronic delivery to meet the same requirements).
61. See id. at 53,461.
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In addition, materials sent by the Internet may be intercepted
and changed before they reach the recipient.62 The Commission im-
posed conditions on the senders to reduce the recipient's risks to this
possibility, subject to a reasonableness standard.63 Presumably, the
Commission determined that by agreeing to receive prospectuses
through the Internet the investors do not agree to bear this risk, ex-
cept where reasonable precautions by the issuers are insufficient.
Thus, so long as the costs to the information sender of protecting re-
cipients from these risks are not high, the sender is liable.
In sum, the Commission allowed the use of the Internet and at
the same time imposed conditions that equate information transfer
through the new medium with information transfer through the mails
and other traditional media. The law was adapted to the changing
environment of the Internet by allowing its use (and its advantages)
while maintaining the values and policies underlying the securities
laws. The Internet rules have the same impact as the pre-Internet
rules.6'
2. Response of Securities Laws' Enforcement Mechanisms
The enforcement mechanisms of the requirement for prospectus
delivery are affected by the Internet. Arguably, the real world has
lost control over the Internet - the cyberspace and the virtual world it
has created. 65  Hence, some proponents of this view say: cyberspace
should be left alone.' I beg to differ.
62. See id. at 53,460 (requiring those providing information to "take the reasonable precau-
tions to ensure the integrity and security of that information").
63. See id.
64. For other examples of the Commission's adaptation of the law to the use of the Inter-
net, see Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No.
40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,847 (Dec. 22, 1998) (final rules); Regulation of Exchanges and
Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 39,884, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,504 (Apr. 29,
1998) (Proposing Release); Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed.
Reg. 30,485 (June 4, 1997) (Concept Release); Cross-Border Tender Offers, Business Combina-
tions and Rights Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 7611, 63 Fed. Reg. 69,136 (Dec. 15, 1998)
(Proposing Release); Statement of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to Of-
fer Securities, Solicit Securities Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore, Securi-
ties Act Release No. 7606A, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,174 (Dec. 4, 1998) (Proposing Release); Statement
of the Commission Regarding Use of Internet Web Sites to Offer Securities, Solicit Securities
Transactions or Advertise Investment Services Offshore, Securities Act Release No. 7516, 63
Fed. Reg. 14,806 (Mar. 27, 1998) (Interpretation); Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder
Communications, Securities Act Release No. 7607, 63 Fed. Reg. 67,331 (Dec. 4, 1998) (Propos-
ing Release).
65. See David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders- The Rise of Law in Cyber-
space, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1370 (1996) (arguing that the rise of a cyberspace network is de-
stroying the power of local governments to control its behavior).
66. Cf id. at 1380 ("[A]ssertion by any local jurisdiction of the right to set the rules appli-
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To be sure, a number of the traditional enforcement mechanisms
of this "real" world cannot be effectively applied to the virtual world
because the costs of such enforcement have greatly risen. For exam-
ple, the Internet has increased the cost of enforcing the prohibition
on misleading statements and offers of securities without registration
because it is more difficult to identify and apprehend the senders and
because senders can reach many parties.67 However, the loss of con-
trol is not complete so long as some connections exist, as they must,
between the real world and the virtual world of the Internet.
First and foremost are the actors. They may exist in the two
worlds, but none of them occupies only the virtual world. Law ap-
plies to these actors and their actions. The Internet allows actors to
do things they could not do before, in ways they could not do before,
or in less time that was required before, but that is all. It may be
harder to locate some actors than to locate others, but most can still
be located and disciplined. In principle, those in the real world can
control the virtual world.
However, in the virtual world, governments' ability to enforce
some of their rules has weakened. 68 The "earthbound" actors, such as
the telephone companies and other technical staff or the National
Science Foundation, are not necessarily those who communicate.
These conduits may be justified in rejecting responsibility for the sub-
stance of the information they transmit. Therefore, there may be a
need to adopt new enforcement mechanisms and perhaps different
norms to effectively regulate the virtual world.69 Further, the focus of
enforcement may change. For example, rather than regulate securi-
ties offerings on which some securities acts are based, it may be more
effective to regulate securities purchases. That would bring into play
the issuers' acceptance of payments rather than their communica-
tions, and the payment mechanisms that may be more identifiable
and subject to regulation. In addition, the securities issuers may be
regulated to require them to disseminate information more fre-
quently and fully.
Second, new enforcement mechanisms may be created. For ex-
ample, a possible enforcement avenue is to provide incentives for a
cable to the 'domain name space' is an illegitimate extra-territorial power grab.").
67. See Katrina Brooker, The Scary Rise of Internet Stock Scams, FORTUNE, Oct. 26, 1998,
at 187 (noting that the Internet enables "crooks" to find large numbers of "potential victims"
"quickly, cheaply, and anonymously").
68. Cf Dipak K. Rastogi, Living Without Borders, Bus. Q., Summer 1997, at 48.
69. See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1407 (1996).
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new profession to police the communications or the communicators
on the Internet. Cyberspace gatekeepers could be required to receive
approvals from, and pay for, the monitoring of such professional ac-
tors, similar to those who must receive and pay for audited financial
statements or legal opinions in order to make a public offering of se-
curities. Such incentives to professionals are effective because the
profession obtains a government monopoly and can make a good
living. The cost to the gatekeepers must, of course, be evaluated, but
competition among the new professionals may reduce their fees.
These fees may be far lower than the losses incurred by investors
short-term and by the markets long-term when prohibition of harmful
practices is not strictly enforced by government.
Third, technology is now being developed to limit and control
access to the Internet or access to particular audiences. For example,
offers to sophisticated investors that need not be accompanied by an
effective registration statement and a statutory prospectus can be
made either by providing investors with special keys to the particular
offering sites or by announcing that the offerings are not available to
all readers.70 Alternatively, cautionary language on offerings that cer-
tain regulatory systems do not apply to them may prove effective.71
Fourth, the costs of enforcing law may have changed. But not all
costs have increased; the Internet has helped reduce some of the
costs. 72 Thus, securities law enforcement has used the new technol-
ogy; for example, the Commission has established areas on its Inter-
net site where investors can inform the Commission about violations
of the law and ask questions from the staff.
73
The Commission has used the Internet to warn investors against
certain promises that are "too good to be true" because "they are"
70. See, e.g., IPONET, SEC No-Action Letter, [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 77,252, at 77,270 (July 26, 1996).
71. See Christina K. McGlosson, Comment, Who Needs Wall Street? The Dilemma of
Regulating Securities Trading in Cyberspace, 5 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 305, 309-10 (1997)
(noting the Pennsylvania regulations and NASAA proposals involving cautionary language).
72. See Joseph F. Celia III & John Reed Stark, SEC Enforcement and the Internet: Meeting
the Challenge of the Next Millenium, A Program for the Eagle and the Internet, 52 BUS. LAW.
815, 836 (1997) (noting that Internet "scam artists" usually must surface because they want in-
vestors to contact them).
73. See id. at 844-46 (noting the establishment of an Enforcement Complaint Center and
educational initiatives, including initiatives on the Commission's website and in Internet fo-
rums). The Commission's website can be found at http://www.sec.gov/ and offers many features
to users, including information about the Commission, investor assistance and a forum for com-
plaints, a database of EDGAR filings, a digest of recent SEC statements, and current SEC
rulemaking information.
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and to caution investors against fraudulent practices.74 The National
Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") has a statutory power
and duty of regulating the broker-dealer community, subject to the
supervision of the Commission.7 ' Among its duties, the NASD super-
vises the advertising of its members.76 Since many broker-dealers use
the Internet to advertise, the NASD has been using software that
scans the Internet automatically and picks certain words, such as "as-
sure," "secure," "guarantee," "20 percent and more," and similar
words that denote a promise of high return and low risk.77 These ad-
vertisements are then evaluated by examiners. 7 1 In short, fire can
sometimes be fought with fire.
3. The Choice of Adaptive Mechanisms and Method of Adaptation
In the case of prospectus delivery, the Commission is the legiti-
mate traditional adaptive mechanism and there is no reason to substi-
tute another mechanism for it. The Commission's relationship with
the industry is ongoing, as issuers file their registration statements
with the Commission. The response of the agency to developments
was quite prompt. In early 1995, the Commission guided the industry
by publishing an Interpretive Release with respect to the delivery of
prospectuses through the Internet.7 9 This adaptation of the law to the
changed circumstances of the industry and the market actors seems to
have worked smoothly and quite well. °
III. REGULATION OF SECURITIES EXCHANGES
A second change in the environment of securities markets and its
actors is the introduction of trading sites. In this case, sponsors or is-
suers offer the holders of securities a meeting place where buyers and
74. See McGlosson, supra note 71, at 312 (noting the establishment of an "Investor Alerts"
section on the Commission's web page).
75. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1994) (granting the Commission oversight authority over self-
regulatory organizations).
76. See NASD Manual (CCH) Rule 2210, at 4171 (Aug. 1997) (regulating communications
with the public).
77. See Brooker, supra note 67, at 198 (noting NASD's use of NetWatch software pro-
gram).
78. See NASD Will Employ Automation to Beef Up Its Internet Surveillance, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Feb. 13, 1998, at C5 (noting that the Netwatch indicators will "serve as guides for
further investigation").
79. See Use of Electronic Media, supra note 5, at 53,458.
80. See Beth Duncan, Wallman Suggests SEC Should Be Open to Seminal, Not Incremental,
Change, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 993 (July 18, 1997) (noting that the initial response was
"dismay at the lack of specific guidance," but ultimately issuers were pleased).
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sellers of the securities may trade. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 regulates the securities markets, including exchanges, where in-
vestors trade their shares.8" Since markets in the United States are
mainly conducted by market intermediaries-broker-dealers, market
makers, underwriters, and other institutions that have joined the
markets, such as subsidiaries of bank holding companies and insur-
ance companies-the primary regulation of these marketplaces or
market systems is performed by a self-regulatory organization of the
intermediaries, subject to the oversight of the Commission.'
Based on the framework developed in Part I, this Part inquires
into the lawmakers' reaction to this new format of trading and into
the need for adaptation of the law's substance, enforcement, and
change mechanisms and methods.
The policies underlying the regulation of the exchanges can be
summarized as: (1) maintaining investor confidence in the markets
(treating investors, especially small investors, fairly, and avoiding
overreaching and conflict of interest treatment of investors by market
intermediaries); 83 (2) maintaining efficient markets from which both
issuers and investors benefit (orderly markets, assuring instantaneous
or timely public price information, effective enforcement of trades);'
and (3) reducing the costs of trading.85
A. Need to Adapt Securities Regulation to Internet Communications:
Impact of the Internet on the Environment of Actors that Maintain
Exchanges and Trade on Exchanges
Because the Internet can be used to exchange information, it can
be used as a forum for securities trading, similar to securities ex-
changes. Entrepreneurs, issuers, or market intermediaries (e.g., bro-
kers and dealers) can set up websites, inviting shareholders for free or
for a fee (or other form of compensation) to enter the sites and trade
with other shareholders. For holders of shares that are not traded on
exchanges and have illiquid or no markets, such websites are likely to
increase liquidity. Shareholders value liquidity and are willing to
81. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (1994).
82. See id. § 78s (granting the Commission oversight and authority over self-regulatory or-
ganizations).
83. See, e.g., id. § 78f(b)(5) (providing that the rules of an exchange "are designed to pre-
vent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices").
84. See id. (providing that rules of an exchange are designed "to remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market").
85. See id. (implying policy of reducing costs of trading).
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forego returns on liquid shares. Therefore, for the issuers generally
and issuers of illiquid securities especially, such trading sites can re-
duce the cost of capital.
Trading sites established by actors other than groups of interme-
diaries are a new phenomenon.86 The current securities laws regulat-
ing exchanges do not fit these trading sites. The Commission was
asked to determine whether trading websites fall within the definition
of "exchange" in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, whether they
should be regulated, and if so, how. In response to a request for clari-
fication of the status of trading sites, the staff issued several no-action
letters that allow the opening of such sites under certain conditions. 
8
This discussion is limited to sites established by issuers of securities,
providing a forum for trading by the holders of their securities.
To evaluate the impact of the need for changing the securities
laws, we first examine the impact of the Internet on the actors that
maintain and trade on exchanges and trading sites by exploring the
differences and similarities between trading sites and traditional ex-
changes. Internet trading sites and exchanges are similar in that they
offer trading forums to investors and the benefit of liquidity.' How-
ever, this similarity is not as close as it seems at first blush because
Internet trading sites offer a trading forum to investors who "do it
themselves," 89 while the exchanges are forums for intermediaries who
trade on behalf of investors or to some extent for their own ac-
86. See Steven M.H. Wallman, Regulating in a World of Technological and Global Change,
METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., Oct. 1996, at 1 n.2 ("Some companies have already set up
Internet trading sites.").
87. A no-action letter was granted to Real Goods Trading Corporation ("RGTC") on June
24, 1996, allowing it to establish an "off the grid" trading system for its common stock. See
RGTC No-Action Letter, supra note 7, at 77,131. Since granting the no-action letter to RGTC,
the Commission has granted such letters to other corporations proposing to operate similar sites
and will no longer respond to such requests "unless they present novel or unusual issues."
Flamemaster Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 762990, at *6 (Oct. 29, 1996). The Com-
mission has spoken only vaguely about other areas where the Internet may affect the secondary
market. See Securities and Exchange Commission, Report to the Congress: The Impact of Recent
Technological Advances on the Securities Markets (last modified Nov. 26, 1997) <http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/techrp97.htm>.
88. Issuers who promote trading sites are interested in offering their shareholders an inex-
pensive trading forum to reduce the issuers' cost of capital.
89. RGTC did not propose to execute or settle any transactions itself, but merely to pro-
vide a passive "bulletin board," which would provide information about prospective buyers and
sellers of its stock. See RGTC No-Action Letter, supra note 7, at 77,131. Any transactions
would occur only through direct contact between participants who would need their own exemp-
tions from the securities acts. See id. at 77,132. Presumably, these trades could be effectuated
through broker-dealers or by eliminating the role of the broker-dealer, through the issuer's
transfer agent, or by physically exchanging the paper shares.
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counts.' Thus, both the promoters and users of the sites are different
from those involved in exchanges.
In essence, trading sites eliminate the broker-dealers and other
securities intermediaries, resulting in benefits and costs to investors.91
On the benefits side, sites eliminate the cost of intermediaries and the
risks from intermediaries' overreaching. However, Internet trading
sites pose for investors a number of dangers-dangers against which
they are protected by the intermediaries in traditional exchanges and
other securities markets. When the intermediaries leave, these dan-
gers appear.
Intermediaries serve two crucial functions in the markets. First,
they ensure that the parties will not renege on the trades.92 More of-
ten than not, securities trades cannot be executed simultaneously. 9
Because securities markets are volatile, either sellers or buyers would
usually have incentive to renege on the trades before execution. 94 If
that happened often and investors learn about this risk, they would
either demand high returns or cease trading; no markets would de-
velop.
Intermediaries ensure the execution of trades by acting as escrow
agents, holding both sellers' securities and buyers' money.95 Since
these intermediaries obtain their commissions upon execution of the
trades, they have strong incentives to ensure the execution and bear
the costs. If traditional intermediaries disappear and no mechanism
fills the void, it is likely that trading-site markets will not continue to
function, as investors find their trade agreements ineffective and too
90. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (1994) (defining "exchange"); id. § 78k(a)(1) (prohibiting ex-
change members from trading on their own accounts, with exceptions).
91. Professor Donald Langevoort took an early view of the impact of information technol-
ogy on the structure of securities regulation. See Langevoort, supra note 2, at 747. He pointed
out that the current regulatory structure assigns significant roles to intermediaries and argued
that if regulators believe these roles are important, they must either "use the regulatory appara-
tus to maintain the intermediaries' position, and thereby impede generally beneficial market
forces, or seek an alternative means to perform the functions." Id. at 764.
92. See 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL
ASSETS POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES § 3.2.2.3, at 78 (1991) ("Institutions rarely
dishonor their obligations to lend or pay up their demand obligations, except when they fail.").
93. See Richard A. Booth, The Uncertain Case for Regulating Program Trading, 1994
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 1, 61 (noting that "[i]n a made market... buyers and sellers need not be
simultaneously present for a trade to occur").
94. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 92, at 78 ("Price fluctuations tempt buyers and sellers to
breach their obligations when gains and losses are high.").
95. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.4 (1998) (requiring intermediaries to receive securities price within
one payment period, or sell the securities to pay for them); 17 C.F.R. § 31.8(a)(1) (1998) (re-
quiring leverage transaction merchants to maintain cover); id. § 240.15c3-3(b) (requiring brokers
or dealers to control securities subject to sale or vouch for availability).
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costly to enforce. Further, if investors do not understand the working
of the markets, this experience may also reduce their trust in the tra-
ditional markets.
Second, intermediaries publish the prices of the trades.96 Price
information substantially reduces the trading costs for other investors
because it offers shorthand information about the value of the traded
securities. The duty to publish the prices is not imposed on the par-
ties to the trades but on those who service traders.7 If these service
providers disappear, someone else must provide the services as a
condition to maintenance of efficient markets. Further, even though
price information benefits investors generally, not all traders are in-
terested in publishing the price of their bid or ask price.9s Individual
investors may wish to shield their offer or bid prices because this in-
formation may signal their trading position or give the wrong signal
about their evaluation of the securities.'
Third, trading sites need not be connected to other trading ex-
changes. If they develop in isolation, and if different promoters offer
sites for trades in the same securities, inefficient segmented markets
may develop, with different prices for the same securities.
Fourth, issuers' control of trading sites poses unique threats to
the integrity of the sites. Issuers may be tempted to affect the price of
their securities." Moreover, trading sites arguably pose a competi-
96. See id. § 240.11Acl-l(b)(1) (requiring exchanges and associations to establish proce-
dures for making bids available to exchange members); id. § 240.1lAcl-1(c)(1) (requiring mem-
bers to communicate bids and offers to exchange or association); Rule 60(b), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) 2060, at 2645 (Nov. 1996) (requiring members to comply with the Commission rule);
Rule 60(c), id., at 2645-46 (requiring exchanges to make bids and offers reported by specialists
available to quotation vendors).
97. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Acl-l(b)(1), (c)(1); Rule 60(b)-(c), 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
2060, at 2645-46.
98. If an investor wishes to sell at a price and there are no buyers, he may wish to reduce
his asking price, but not publish the reduction. There are mechanisms that would allow the
lower price to be disclosed only to a buyer that agreed to buy at the higher price. Once that
buyer commits to the purchase, the buyer may discover that he could get the stock at a lower
price. On the other hand, if the asking price is not lowered, there may still be no buyers. The
publication may, therefore, depend on the desires of the seller or the buyer, as the case may be.
99. The market in government securities provides a good example. There are few main
dealers that are allowed to bid on government securities. See Business Briefs, N.Y. POST, Oct. 1,
1998, at 34 (noting that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York recognizes 33 primary govern-
ment securities dealers); see also 5 C.F.R. § 6801.102(f) (1998) (defining "primary government
securities dealer" as "a firm with which the Federal Reserve conducts its open market opera-
tions"). They may trade among themselves. However, they would rather not inform each other
of their need for either cash or securities. Hence, they long ago established a buffer, a broker
who receives orders of buy and sell on condition of anonymity.
100. Higher prices indicate successful operations, help raise funds, facilitate planned merg-
ers and acquisitions, and protect against takeovers. Lower prices can facilitate repurchase of
company stock or management leveraged buyouts.
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tive threat to established exchanges if the sites provide the same
services to investors at lower costs. Such competition may be unfair if
trading sites remain unregulated while the exchanges bear regulatory
costs. Although competition can enhance the efficiency of the ex-
changes, an unequal playing field can threaten their existence in the
future. Since the United States' exchanges, especially the New York
Stock Exchange, are among the most, if not the most, efficient ex-
changes in the world, the risk of their lost hegemony by action or in-
action of the Commission can have serious consequences. Thus, be-
fore trading sites are allowed to proceed, the continued viability of
the existing securities markets should be ensured, at least until it is
clear that trading sites can provide a viable alternative to existing
markets. At the same time, because I believe that competition per se
is desirable as a matter of policy, attempts should be made to allow
trading sites to develop under certain conditions. In fact, the Com-
mission has adopted a new regulatory framework to allow alternative
electronic trading systems, as it attempts to adapt the law to the new
environment. The new framework offers persons who wish to con-
duct these electronic trading systems a choice to register as national
securities exchanges or as broker-dealers. 1'
101. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release
No. 40,760, 63 Fed. Reg. 70,844, 70,847 (Dec. 22, 1998); see also Regulation of Exchanges and
Alternative Trading Systems, Exchange Act Release No. 39,884, 63 Fed. Reg. 23,504 (Apr. 29,
1998) (Proposing Release); Regulation of Exchanges, Exchange Act Release No. 38,672, 62 Fed.
Reg. 30,485 (June 4, 1997) (Concept Release). For a discussion of Commission regulation of
alternative trading systems, see Daniel M. Gallagher, Comment, Move Over Tickertape, Here
Comes the Cyber-Exchange: The Rise of Internet-Based Securities Trading Systems, 47 CATH. U.
L. REv. 1009 (1998) (advocating the creation of a new "national securities association" to oper-
ate as a self-regulatory organization for all alternative trading systems).
The alternative trading systems are defined and the choices to the actor are designed to re-
duce regulatory problems. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63
Fed. Reg. at 70,846 (noting that the new regulatory framework "is flexible enough to accommo-
date the evolving technology of, and benefits provided by, alternative trading systems"). New
Rule 3al-1 grants an exemption from regulation as an exchange to alternative trading systems in
compliance with new Regulation ATS and meeting other conditions. See id. at 70,917 (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.3al-l(a)). New Regulation ATS requires alternative trading systems
choosing to register as broker-dealers to comply with enhanced regulation. See id. at 70,921-25
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 242.300-.303) (Regulation ATS).
Regulation ATS generally defines an "alternative trading system" as an entity "[t]hat con-
stitutes.., a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and sellers of securities
or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the functions commonly performed by a
stock exchange" and does not set rules governing subscribers' conduct (except on the exchange)
nor does it discipline them (other than by exclusion). See id. at 70,922 (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 242.300(a)); see also Regulation of Exchanges, 62 Fed. Reg. at 30,486 n.1 (noting that
the term "alternative trading system" is used in the release "to refer generally to automated sys-
tems that centralize, display, match, cross, or otherwise execute trading interest, but that are not
currently registered with the Commission as national securities exchanges or operated by a reg-
istered securities association").
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B. Securities Lawmakers' Response to the Internet Environment:
Substance, Enforcement, Mechanisms for Change, and Methods of
Change
1. Impact on the Substance of the Securities Laws
Internet trading sites change not only the mode of trading among
investors but also the nature and institutional structure of traditional
securities markets. Trading sites are fundamentally different from se-
curities exchanges. They are operated by different actors with differ-
ent incentives and different rewards. Thus, Internet trading sites pro-
vide different institutional infrastructures for securities trading. This
raises the question of how the new type of market affects the policies
underlying securities markets regulation and the rules codifying those
policies.
A textual analysis of the definition of "exchange" in the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 19341' is not helpful. There are no guides in the
existing legislation to interpret the Internet trading "exchanges" as
the new trading sites. They were not anticipated by Congress; they
involve not only a new and different technology but also a very dif-
ferent structure and participating actors.
The underlying policies and values of the Act may be affected by
the trading sites. The results of their regulation are hard to predict
and may lead to new policies and values or to reinforced current poli-
cies and values underlying the law. In sum, trading sites can put in
question the current fundamental policies of the law and require a
different regulatory regime altogether.
An alternative trading system regulated under Regulation ATS must register as a broker-
dealer; file a notice of operation as an alternative trading system; allow Commission examina-
tions, inspections, and investigations; and meet recordkeeping, reporting, and confidentiality
requirements. A system with high trading volume must also provide access to publicly displayed
orders. A system with 20 percent or more of the trading volume in an equity security (or certain
debt securities) must also provide fair access and meet capacity, integrity, and security require-
ments. See Regulation of Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems, 63 Fed. Reg. at 70,922-
24 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)).
In addition, the Commission adopted Rule 3b-16 to revise the definition of "exchange" to
include an entity that "[b]rings together the orders for securities of multiple buyers and sellers"
and "[u]ses established, non-discretionary methods (whether by providing a trading facility or by
setting rules) under which such orders interact with each other, and the buyers and sellers en-
tering such orders agree to the terms of a trade." Id. at 70,918 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. §
240.3b-16(a)); see also id. at 70,848 (noting that the new definition includes markets engaging in
activities functionally equivalent to traditional exchanges). The new definition does not include
"bulletin board types of systems" that display "orders" but allow subscriber3 to contact each
other and agree to terms outside the system. See id. at 70,850 & n.47 (citing no-action letters
involving issuer trading sites).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(1) (1994).
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2. Impact on Enforcement Mechanisms
Presumably, trading sites do not pose enforcement problems for
the Commission. However, they pose serious enforcement problems
for investors. As discussed above, investors may need new and other
guarantors of the trading contracts among them and some new
mechanisms to ensure the performance of the trades regardless of
price fluctuations. It is difficult, however, to envision which mecha-
nism would effectively enforce the traders' contracts. Presumably we
can create mechanisms for guaranteeing the execution of the trades
among individual traders. Such guarantees may be offered by the
promoters of the sites or by third parties, and many other possibilities
come to mind. We can create a link to a national depository that
would confirm trades upon proof of payment. The costs of the new
mechanisms must be evaluated as experience about the sites is gath-
ered.
3. The Choice of Adaptive Mechanisms and Method of Adaptation
The first question that trading sites raise is: Which of the mecha-
nisms for change is best suited to determine the adaptation of the se-
curities laws to the new Internet trading sites: Congress, the courts,
the Commission, or the markets?
Congress should not legislate new regulation for the trading sites.
There is little experience on how these sites function and the conse-
quences of their operations. Congress cannot experiment in allowing
piecemeal limited use of the sites nor monitor the problems they raise
and the problems they solve. °3
The courts are also not the appropriate mechanism for adapting
the securities laws to the trading sites. Courts cannot act unless they
are requested to do so in the case of conflict among parties. Besides,
courts are not equipped to conduct the study necessary to design a
regulatory system nor to enforce such a system. Presumably, if courts
were asked to determine whether trading sites are exchanges, they
would use the policy analysis adopted in the VALIC case" and im-
103. The failure of Congress to develop appropriate regulation in the related field of tele-
communications law is chronicled in Price & Duffy, supra note 1, at 977-79 ("In Congress, we
see an institution bold in word, but incremental in deed."). Price and Duffy explain that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 merely "establishes a framework for the next round of con-
flict-conflict that will take place in courts, regulatory agencies, and the marketplace." Id. at
978.
104. See SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of Am., 359 U.S. 65, 76 (1959) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (examining whether holders of investments need the protection of the securities
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pose the current securities laws on such sites, awaiting the Commis-
sion's adaptation of the law to these new "exchanges."
This situation is precisely one that requires experimentation by
an administrative agency."05 First, the values and policies underlying
the securities acts support implementation of new technology and
trading sites. Second, the Commission has authorized trading sites
under certain conditions."° These conditions might be strict at the
outset and then relaxed as more experience is gathered respecting
any problems that these sites pose."°7 Moreover, the Commission has
expressed that it is "mindful of the benefits of increasing use of new
technologies for investors and the markets, and has encouraged ex-
perimentation and innovation by adopting flexible interpretations of
the federal securities laws."1"8
If the Commission approached the issue by imposing on trading
sites the regulations applicable to exchanges as they exist today, it is
likely to freeze the development of trading sites. These sites cannot
operate under the current exchange regulation and to change the
regulation would require congressional action, which, as we noted
above, is not the appropriate adaptive mechanism in this case.
This brings us to the markets. Could the markets be left to adapt
and shape market customs to regulate trading sites? Leaving the
markets to develop best practices for trading sites is a very attractive
suggestion. The hand of the multitudes of investors and the promot-
ers' behavioral adaptive mode of trial and error might offer regula-
tors a proven, optimal model of regulation. If markets also provide
effective sanctions to those who violate adapted customs, perhaps no
government regulation would be necessary. Further, market "creep-
ing" regulation may avoid unanticipated consequences, which gov-
acts).
105. Professor Lessig suggests a similar approach to the regulation of cyberspace, though he
suggests a different method for getting there. He argues that common law should set the
boundaries of cyberspace because its "undefined potential" requires "lots of room for demo-
cratic experimentation." Lessig, supra note 57, at 1753. "Experimentation, because stable doc-
trine is only built upon the ground of long-standing experimentation." Id.
106. See, e.g., RGTC No-Action Letter, supra note 7, at 77,131.
107. If we follow the logic of Professor George L. Priest, to the extent that any of these new
regulations are inefficient, courts will either overturn them or construe them in a manner which
creates a more efficient regime. See George L. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selec-
tion of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65, 73 (1977) ("Where government suits are brought
under legal rules that are inefficient, the stakes will be higher and defendants will be more likely
to resist the suits and force litigation.").
108. Securities and Exchange Commission, Report to the Congress: The Impact of Recent
Technological Advances on the Securities Markets (last modified Nov. 26, 1997) <http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/techrp97.htm>.
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ernment regulations tend to bring as side effects, regardless of how
well-intentioned and how focused regulators try to be.
I reject markets as a sole mechanism for adapting the securities
laws to trading sites for a number of reasons. First, nothing concern-
ing trading sites suggests that the fundamental policies of ensuring in-
vestor confidence and facilitating capital should be changed. These
remain the main guides to the institutional structures of the markets.
Inexpensive enforcement of trades must be secured. Prices must be
published. Segmentation should be avoided. Yet it is not clear that
markets would heed these policies and ensure compliance with them.
If markets would have heeded these policies in the past, we would not
have government securities regulation today.
Second, the stakes are too high to allow promoters to break, on
their own and for their own benefit, new grounds in shaping the new
institutions for markets, especially when these new markets are still
small. Third, and most importantly, failure to ensure the integrity of
the new markets may taint existing markets. Investors do not always
make refined distinctions when they are defrauded or find they made
decisions without sufficient information. Paradoxically, "free" mar-
kets require a regulatory infrastructure.' 9 This infrastructure can be
developed by the actors, such as broker-dealers and other intermedi-
aries. However, infrastructure is less likely when markets develop by
suppliers of sites and actions of investors. Neither the suppliers nor
the investors are likely to have sufficient identity of interest to com-
bine in self-regulatory organizations and provide the infrastructure."0
Leaving the markets alone to design the trading sites is not the
answer. Leaving the Commission alone to design a regulatory
scheme for the trading sites is also not the full answer. It seems that
we should develop a close interactive adaptive system between the
markets and the Commission. In fact, such an interactive approach is
to some extent already being practiced by the Commission. The
Commission publishes many company proposals for comments;
Commissioners and staff meet regularly with industry representatives,
lawyers, and consumer representative groups. The industry may
109. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, The Evolution of the Government-Business Relationship
in the United States: Colonial Times to Present, 31 AM. BUS. L.J. 553 (1994) (describing, among
other things, how elements of the business community have supported a strong role for the gov-
ernment in creating the environment in which business operates); Joseph P. Tomain & Sidney
A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 377 (1997) (explaining how
governmental regulation attempts to remedy market failures).
110. See Tamar Frankel, Should Funds and Investment Advisers Form a Self-Regulatory Or-
ganization?, in THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION 447 (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 1997).
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make presentations to the staff to educate and provide information.
Lawyers seek and receive the staff's interpretation of the law ex ante,
while offering the staff information about events in the markets. This
does not mean that the parties bare their hearts to each other. Nei-
ther the staff nor the industry are fully informative, but a substantial
amount of information is exchanged between them in a search for a
solution satisfactory to both parties.
It seems that the trading sites require a period of experimenta-
tion, with controlled limits, under close monitoring of the Commis-
sion. It may well be that this method is beginning to take shape in the
form of no-action letters that the staff has issued for issuer trading
sites. The method of change in this case is therefore complex, slow,
experimental, and public. This method is, of course, remindful of the
method by which markets adapt their customary law. It may well be
that we have reached a stage where law's adaptation requires interac-
tion between markets and agencies. Markets represent an amalgama-
tion of perspectives of different actors driven by differing interests,
understandings, and levels of information. In the case of securities
markets and other markets, this amalgamation is translated into the
price in dollars. The dollars become the common denominator.
In the case of market custom, however, the amalgamation of per-
spectives of different actors, driven by various interests and under-
standings and levels of information, does not always reflect a common
denominator. Although custom represents a pattern of behavior that
is followed by an increasing number of actors, this pattern is not
transparent, nor clearly predictable. When regulatory agencies adopt
a custom or "best practices" of an industry, the agencies can meld to-
gether the various aspects of the custom-producing actors; in some re-
spect the agencies provide the missing common denominator that
money would have provided in the form of price, to create better
rules while subsuming the substance of the customs.
How do agencies collate and meld together items that do not
emanate from similar sources or for similar reasons (sometimes from
conflicting reasons)? Put differently, how do agencies generalize dis-
parate items that are generated by disparate driving forces and for
different reasons? The answer is: not by mathematical addition.
Rather, a "soft process" of judgment based on information, context,
and experience brings about a coherent rule based on the substance
of the custom. This process is demonstrated by the restatements of
the laws and codification of uniform laws-drafting, articulation of
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norms, and rationalization of market customs.
One form of interaction between the staff of the Commission
and industry is worth noting; this form is not unique to the agency
and is practiced, in different ways, by other agencies as well. The
Commission's staff has been offering the public informal views on
proposed activities that may raise issues under the federal securities
laws.' These letters offer a number of advantages.
The letters inform the staff about proposed transactions in the
market, possible legal barriers to novel transactions, and problems
they might pose for investors. The letters help avoid or reduce en-
forcement by litigation and leave some room for restructuring and le-
gitimizing proposed activities. No-action letters benefit the public
and strengthen the rule of law by publicizing the staff's interpretation
and application of the securities laws."2 The business community has
come to depend on the consistent application of the letters' rulings in
making business decisions. The process facilitates business transac-
tions, especially novel transactions, that may not exactly fit within the
regulatory framework when the interpretation of the law applicable
to them is uncertain.
The main source of the staff's authority is its discretion to rec-
ommend that the Commission prosecute violations of the statutes un-
der its jurisdiction."' The weight given to the staff's letters depends
mostly on the type of reasoning on which the decision is based. When
the letter represents the opinion of the staff on a particular legal is-
sue,114 the letter is likely to be viewed as a precedent on the legal is-
111. In response to letters of inquiry, the staff issues "no-action letters" stating that the staff
will not recommend to the Commission an enforcement action if the proposed activities take
place. See Monthly Publication of List of Significant Letters Issued by the Division of Corpo-
rate Finance, Securities Act Release No. 5691, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,682 (Mar. 31, 1976) (describing
the no-action letter process). Hence the name: "no-action letters." For a discussion of the no-
action letter process, see 1 FRANKEL, supra note 41, ch. II, sec. C., §§ 1-5.2, at 148.
112. In recent years the staff has resorted to letters to the Investment Company Institute,
expressing the staff's concerns about certain issues or events. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst.,
1993 SEC No-Act. Lexis 673 (Apr. 19, 1993). These letters help inform the industry about the
staffs concerns, and often elicit the industry's response by voluntary self-enforcement or self-
studies that provide information to the staff and can result in self-enforcement. See
INVESTMENT CO. INST., REPORT TO THE DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INSTITUTE'S
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PERSONAL INVESTING (1995), summarized in Mutual Funds Have Im-
plemented Institute's Recommendations on Personal Investing, ICI Survey Finds, PR Newswire,
Apr. 21, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
113. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 41, ch. II, sec. C, § 3, at 148. Therefore, no-action letters
state that the staff grants or denies assurance that it will not recommend an enforcement action
to the Commission.
114. Usually the request letter analyzes the law and the staff may either agree with the posi-
tion in the letters of request or with part of the position, or offer its own interpretation, leading
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sues in the particular fact pattern, at least until it is reversed by the
staff, the Commission, or the courts."5 Courts, however, often defer
to the staff's legal interpretation and expertise. 6 When the staff
grants a no-action position even "without necessarily agreeing with"
the requestor's legal position,' 1 such a letter has less weight than an
interpretative letter.' It might still be used by third parties if the
facts at hand closely resemble those cited in the letter. 9
Formally and officially, no-action letters have no value as prece-
dents.20 Neither the Commission nor the staff are bound by these no-
action letters. 2' Yet, practicing attorneys and academics view no-
action letters as a source of law, and they are considered precedents
by parties other than the recipients, providing a partial safe harbor
and guidance to practitioners.22 The letters augment the limited
number of court cases and Commission interpretations and are some-
times the only authoritative interpretations of the Act. Perhaps the
paucity of judicial decisions may be attributed in part to no-action let-
ters that meet the needs of the parties and the industry. Moreover,
the no-action process is generally less costly than a formal exemptive
application or Commission administrative action, and far less costly
than litigation.
So long as the staff and the Commission value no-action letters,
they will accord them precedential weight. If people could not rely
on these letters people would cease to ask for them, and the benefits
from such letters to the staff, the Commission, the industry, and the
to the no-action position. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. The main reason for such letters is that, although the proposed activities are impermis-
sible, or it is unclear whether they are permissible, the staff will not recommend enforcement
action, presumably because the Commission's resources would be better employed otherwise.
See id.
118. See id.
119. A third type of reasoning is that the proposed activities are very unique and in all prob-
ability will not be repeated by the requestor or anyone else. Although in most letters the staff
emphasizes that the letters have no precedential value and are limited to the particular case, in
these unique cases the language of the emphasis is stronger. See id. A favorable response lim-
ited to a unique situation is a far weaker precedent for an identical set of facts in a similar con-
text.
120. See id. § 1, at 148.
121. See id.
122. See id.; SIMON M. LORNE ET AL., SECURITIES LAW CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS A-8 (BNA Corp. Practice Series No. 44-2nd, 1997) ("Persons ob-
taining no-action letters are entitled to rely on them, but generally other persons are not entitled
to so rely. However, since 1971 ... [the Commission] has at least moved toward allowing a
more general reliance although not as a formal policy.").
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parties would be lost. That may be the reason why the staff is con-
cerned with uniformity and predictability of no-action letters. The
frequency with which the staff reverses prior letters differs depending
on changes in the business environment and the industry, the prob-
lems that the letters addressed, and the unintended consequences that
such letters brought about.1 13 Thus, the letters provide substantial
comfort to their recipients even in private litigation.'24
In some respects no-action letters are similar to judicial decisions
because they are based on specific fact situations, rely on precedents,
and constitute precedents, especially when they provide analysis and
reasoning. The letters differ from a judicial decision because they are
given with little express legal authority and are granted ex ante, and
not ex post, as a result of conflict. The letters are similar to customary
law. Their age and extent of following adds to their precedential
weight. Their flexibility allows for adjusting law to changing circum-
stances. For law's adaptation to the Internet environment, they may
be a most appropriate tool.
CONCLUSION
This article offers a first step towards an examination of adapta-
tion of law to a changing environment of the actors that are regulated
by law. I suggest a model of law as a structured, adaptive, self-
replicating system of coercive communications regulating relation-
ships among types of actors (individuals or groups). The three-part
structure of the law consists of substantive communications that differ
in their degree of generality (specific cases, rules, policies, and val-
ues), mechanisms for enforcing the law, and mechanisms for adapting
law when the actors that are regulated experience a new environment
(legislatures, administrative agencies, courts, the markets), using
methods of adaptation (textual analysis, analogy, and policy analysis).
When the environment of regulated actors changes rapidly, as it
changes today and is likely to change in the future, a new combined
123. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 41, ch. II, sec. C, § 4.1, at 148.
124. See id. § 4.2, at 148. In some cases courts may refuse to defer to the staff's interpreta-
tion of the law; for example, if the issue does not involve a matter within the special expertise of
the staff or when the Commission is the plaintiff-to avoid a result that the agency would be
both prosecutor and legislator. See id. § 5.1, at 148; see also New York City Employees' Retire-
ment Sys. v. American Brands, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1382, 1389 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (refusing to
defer where issue does not involve matter within special expertise of staff); SEC v. Energy
Group, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 1234, 1238 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (refusing to defer where Commission is
plaintiff).
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mechanism of markets and agencies is being developed to adapt the
law accordingly. This new mechanism and its methods of adaptation
invite a close examination and empirical study, for I believe this is the
future mechanism for legal change.
